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THE REALM OF RIGHTS. By Judith Jarvis Thomson. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 1990. Pp. viii, 373. $35. 
The nature and moral force of rights is one of the most frequently 
recurring themes in W estem philosophical and political discourse. 1 
What does it mean to have a right? Which of many contenders de-
serves to be a called a right, and who possesses them? What are the 
sources of rights? These important questions confront all those who 
believe that part of being human is possessing certain rights.2 Judith 
Jarvis Thomson's latest contribution to this discussion is The Realm of 
Rights, 3 an engaging and insightful investigation into ethical theory. 
Thomson's approach to rights theory differs in two ways from that 
employed by most authors. First, she focuses primarily on what hav-
ing a right means instead of analyzing what rights we do or should 
possess.4 Second, the arguments she advances concerning what rights 
we possess do not depend primarily on any particular analytic device 
or teleological conception of humanity. Instead, she argues from vari-
ous assumptions, some concerning the moral content of particular ac-
tions and some concerning how most persons would view such 
actions.5 
The Realm of Rights consists of two distinct but related sections. 
The first, "Rights: What They Are," is the more interesting and un-
common of the two. 6 Thomson first separates rights into claims, privi-
1. At least as early as Socrates, Western philosophers have explicitly considered rights and 
their sources. See, for example, Plato's Apologia, where he discusses Socrates' views concerning 
individuals' freedom of conscience and religion. Recent important attempts to provide rational 
and complete methods of understanding rights include ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, 
AND UTOPIA (1975), JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE (1971), and MICHAEL SANDEL, 
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JusncE (1982). 
2. Most modem philosophers follow the traditional practice of suggesting that the rights 
enjoyed by humans are not similarly enjoyed by animals. Exceptions are becoming increasingly 
prominent. See, e.g., ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND CoUNTY ALMANAC (1966). In fact, it has been 
seriously argued that the biosphere we call earth is in an important sense an entity which has 
rights. See, e.g., Iredell Jenkins, Nature's Rights and Man's Duties, in LAW AND THE EcoLOGI-
CAL CHALLENGE 87 (Eugene E. Dais ed., 1978) (arguing that humanity has a moral duty to 
decree its own extinction to preserve the earth). Thomson does not subscribe to this approach. 
3. Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology. Thomson's previous works include ACI'S AND OTHER EVENTS (1977) and RIGHTS, 
REsTmmON, AND RISK (1986). 
4. This is in contrast with most important modem investigations of rights and ethics. See, 
e.g., RAWLS, supra note 1; SANDEL, supra note 1. 
5. In this respect Thomson is reminiscent of Ronald Dworkin, who also eschews rights para-
digms derived from first principles in favor of investigations premised upon a small number of 
what he considers widely held beliefs concerning morality. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978). 
6. Many authors have attempted to argue, from virtually innumerable starting positions, that 
certain sets of rights belong to certain groups of peoples or entities. See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, 
ON LAW, MORALITY, AND PoLmcs (William P. Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan eds., 1988) 
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leges, powers, and immunities {pp. 37-60). Claims are rights to be free 
from the effects of certain activities others might engage in - for ex-
ample, the right to be free from physical assault. Privileges are rights 
to take action that would otherwise violate another's claim - my 
right to eat your salad after you give me permission, for example. A 
power is the ability to alter the rights of oneself or others, as the owner 
of a typewriter may alter two persons' rights by giving it away. An 
immunity is a right to prevent another person or persons from exercis-
ing a power against you. Your ownership of a typewriter, for example, 
makes you immune to my altering the cluster of rights ownership con-
fers on you. To the extent there are inalienable rights, persons possess 
immunities against themselves. The section then discusses the rela-
tionship between rights and constraints on the behavior of others, with 
particular emphasis on when a claim should be accommodated and 
when countervailing considerations are sufficient to justify infringing a 
claim.7 
Thomson's method of analysis in this section closely resembles 
that employed in abstract mathematical investigations. She begins by 
accepting certain statements as postulates, without justification. These 
postulates are assertions that certain moral relationships are true; ra-
tional deduction and logic expand the few postulates into numerous 
and diverse conclusions. For example, Thomson assumes without ar-
gument that possession of a right constrains the behavior of another. 8 
This method of argumentation is central to the first section and 
dominates any consideration of the section's strengths and weaknesses. 
All investigations of moral theory must make some assumptions,9 and 
Thomson's decision to make concrete and detailed assumptions has 
important benefits. In a few bold steps, she makes significant progress 
toward establishing a comprehensive paradigm of rights that is de-
tailed enough to provide answers to complex moral dilemmas. The 
decision also imparts a tone of confidence to her writing that brings 
the comfort of being in the company of a sure-footed guide through 
the morass. 10 
(arguing for rights based upon the gift of God); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence 
Irwin trans., 1985) (arguing for rights based upon the unique attributes of humanity); RAWLS, 
supra note 1 (arguing for rights based on those which would be chosen behind a "veil of igno-
rance"). Fewer, however, have explicitly addressed the issue of what exactly a right is, and what 
a possessor can do with it. 
7. Thomson argues that rights/claims are not absolute and so may morally be infringed in 
some situations. She distinguishes violating a claim, which is failing to accord a claim without 
sufficient justification. 
8. "I did not first argue that A's having that right against B does constrain B's behavior in 
some way, and then proceed to ask what precisely that way is; I took for granted you would agree 
that A's having the right against B does constrain B's behavior ..•• " P. 64. 
9. Philosophers have long recognized the necessity of making at least some assumptions, the 
most famous of which may be Descartes's cogito ergo sum. Various assumptions seem more or 
less plausible, depending on their complexity and their intuitive appeal. 
10. This is in stark contrast, for example, to the communitarian-influenced theories of 
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This enthusiastic use of postulates is not without a price, however; 
the method that provides beauty and intellectual excitement in the ex-
ercise of abstract mathematics is less well-suited to a discipline seeking 
answers applicable to our world and not a hypothetical one. Some 
important assumptions slice through the Gordian knot so abruptly 
they leave the reader wondering if a page, or at least a footnote, is 
missing. For example, Thomson indicates that X's possession of a 
claim (a particular type of right) against Y is equivalent to Y's behav-
ior's being constrained in some way related to X's claim.11 This asser-
tion that rights have a tangible existence and moral force in the world 
of actions is surely central to any book concerning rights and ethics.12 
Yet we are blithely asked to accept it as true because "that is surely 
correct" (p. 65). This example demonstrates two difficulties inherent 
in the approach. First, arguing from a set of "truths" ensures that 
many central and difficult problems are not rigorously analyzed. 
Thomson's approach ignores the important and interesting question 
why having a right is equal to a constraint. This is unsatisfying to 
those seeking to examine our culture's assumptions at a deeper level. 
Although finding a principled and satisfying reason why rights exist 
and are what they are is difficult, or perhaps impossible, investigation 
of the question is both interesting and theoretically crucial. The sec-
ond difficulty is more prosaic. If the reader disagrees with a postulate 
preceding a lengthy discussion, several pages lose their interest. An 
unconvincing argument may at least be thought-provoking, if not en-
tirely persuasive. However, when the argument is not for an unper-
suasive premise, but from an unpersuasive premise, the situation is 
very different and presents little to engage the reader. 
Other aspects of the first section are very impressive. The delinea-
tion of rights into four distinct types substantially aids the attempt to 
think rigorously about them. Thomson draws extensively on the work 
of Wesley Hohfeld13 and applies his legal ideas to the realm of ethics. 
She also expands upon his ideas by, for example, demonstrating that 
some rights are in fact "cluster-rights" - rights such as liberty that 
include within them several subsidiary rights (pp. 53-55). 
The discussion of utilitarianism is similarly powerful, both in its 
Michael Sandel, which provide rights that are more nebulous and contingent. See SANDEL, 
supra note 1. 
11. P. 64. Thomson ducks, however, the more complicated question whether the two state-
ments are identical. 
12. If one assumes a world where God is dead, it is certainly not preposterous to argue that 
rights are merely a useful human construct and have no real existence or force. Some feminist 
scholars argue in a related fashion that rights have no real existence but are creations of patri-
archy designed to create division, oppression, and ownership. See, e.g., NELL NODDINGS, CAR-
ING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (1984); Patricia A. Cain & 
Jean C. Love, Stories of Rights: Developing Moral Theory and Teaching Law, 86 MICH. L. REv. 
1365, 1384 (1988). 
13. WESLEY HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS (Walter Cook ed., 1919). 
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description of consequentialist act and nonconsequentialist act utilita-
rianism and in its demonstration that neither can explain the moral 
reactions most people have to specific situations (pp. 124-48). Thom-
son concludes that rights have intrinsic value, which must be consid-
ered when evaluating any action related to rights. This conclusion 
leaves her a difficult task - calculating the value of a right, and 
thereby determining when it may be infringed. Thomson rightly ar-
gues that rejecting utilitarianism allows claim infringement "if and 
only if sufficiently much more good would come of infringing it than 
would come of not infringing it" (p. 149; emphasis added). Although 
her answer to the question of what increment of good is sufficient "is 
that there is no answer" (p. 153), Thomson does provide several inter-
esting examples to help frame the problem. 
One major question when assessing the level of good necessary to 
justify claim infringement is whether a benefit enjoyed by fifty people 
should be accorded fifty times the weight of a similar benefit enjoyed 
by only one. Thomson concludes that the sum does not matter and 
that claims may only be infringed when one individual will receive 
sufficient good to justify the infringement (pp. 166-67). Not enough 
time is spent here, however. Thomson may be correct in refusing to 
infringe 1,000 claims in order to provide equivalent benefits to 1,001 
other persons. And she may be correct even when the numerical dis-
parity is much greater but the claims are very stringent; perhaps it is 
impermissible to kill one person to save a million others. Yet her con-
clusion is implausible when there are great numerical disparities and 
weak claims. It seems perfectly acceptable for you to tweak my nose if 
doing so will prevent a million other nose-tweakings. These distinc-
tions between large and small numerical disparities and between more 
and less stringent claims merit further consideration. 
The second section, "Rights: Which They Are,'' examines the 
rights people do and do not possess. Discussion begins with what 
Thomson calls "natural rights" - those which accrue to persons by 
virtue of (1) humans' ability to conform themselves to a moral code 
and (2) the individuality of every person (p. 222). The section contin-
ues with a discussion of "social rights" (those bestowed only by soci-
ety) and their relationship to natural rights. The final chapter is an 
interesting examination of how people can lose rights, concluding that 
this loss can occur without fault or volition. 
This section's method of argumentation is similar to that found in 
the first section, with similar benefits and difficulties. The first sec-
tion's assumptions about the nature of rights are replaced by two other 
types of assumptions: (1) those concerning what moral conclusions 
are required by certain "obvious" situations and (2) those concerning 
what moral views the majority of persons would have concerning a 
situation. As she concedes, "I take much of the stuff of morality as 
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given: I do not offer a recipe for constructing it out of elementary 
particles" (p. 4). For example, she provides a hypothetical surgeon the 
opportunity to save five lives by killing one patient to transplant her 
organs. Without analysis, Thomson says: "That he ought, or even 
may, [proceed] is so obviously false that it would be a disaster for a 
moral theory to [so conclude]: a theory that [so concludes] is a theory 
in dire need of revision. In short, I take [such conclusions'] being false 
to be a datum."14 Thomson's positivistic acceptance as postulates of 
those moral conclusions apparently accepted by a large majority is es-
pecially striking. Indeed, the book's first sentence is "We take our-
selves to have rights." 
These two methods ultimately reduce to counting votes, an ap-
proach with several difficulties. First, it is not at all clear that such a 
consensus can be developed over a broad range of situations. Second, 
such an approach is haphazard, and amounts mostly to a summary 
validation of extant notions of rights. Thomson convincingly dis-
cusses the difficulties in deriving ought from is, but then dismisses 
them with insufficient analysis. For example, she attempts to derive 
ought from is by relying on claims such as: "(1) A will be acting 
rudely if he shouts 'Boo!' [implies that] (2) Other things being equal, A 
ought not shout 'Boo!' And isn't (2) a moral judgment?" (p. 12). This 
argument, however, implicitly relies on a normative judgment of what 
is to evaluate morality (what should be). It is true that (2) is a moral 
judgment, but so is (1) and (1) can only lead to (2) to the extent that 
(1) is a moral judgment and not merely a descriptive statement. 
An especially unfortunate weakness of this approach is that it may 
yield results not applicable in different cultural contexts. For example, 
Thomson says it is clear that causing one person to feel any level of 
pain is an impermissible method of saving five others from that pain 
(p. 252). This is far from clear to me, and likely even more dubious to 
non-Western individuals. For example, African human rights treaties 
emphasize duties and community at the expense of what Western peo-
ple might call individualism.15 Thomson's contingent view of morality 
therefore provides no solid basis for a distribution of rights; rights can 
only exist within human groups small enough and homogenous 
enough to make consensus possible. 
Finally, Thomson's reliance on positivism and the absence from 
her work of an accompanying analytic framework make it difficult to 
reach conclusions where intuition fails. The reader is provided no 
principled method of assessing the relative value of various moral fac-
tors. For example, Thomson suggests that it is impermissible to ac-
14. P. 135. Thomson is very open about her methods. She acknowledges that disagreement 
with her premises yields disagreement with her conclusions. 
15. See, e.g., African Charter on Human and People's Rights, arts. 27-29 (1981), reprinted in 
CHRISM. PETER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 108-09 (1990). 
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cede to a mafia demand to kill A in order to save B, C: D, E, and F (pp. 
140-41). This seems perfectly plausible. It also seems plausible even if 
we assume that such a trade with the mafia would work and that we 
live in a world where this is the mafia's final act, so that there are no 
problems related to providing incentives to further extortion.16 Yet 
Thomson's analysis of the trolley hypothetical17 suggests exactly the 
opposite conclusion. Thomson concludes that it is permissible to turn 
the trolley by reasoning that such a response would have been ap-
proved by all trolley workers if they had met in advance and knew that 
their positions on the two tracks would be assigned by lot. But if soci-
ety consisted of six persons, of whom five would later be abducted by 
the mafia, and we asked them in advance what action they would wish 
taken, all six would likely ask that the one person be sacrificed to save 
the five. While it does seem at a gut level that a different response is 
appropriate in this situation, Thomson does not justify the difference. 
Perhaps the fact that one instrument of death is animate instead of 
inanimate is a critical difference, but Thomson does not tell the reader 
why. She does hint that the impermissibility of action in the trans-
plant hypothetical may be due to some notion of .bodily integrity, but 
does not explain how her conception of rights accounts for this notion. 
Is bodily integrity a personal right? A societal right? A right of hu-
mankind? Without further explanation of her conclusion, it is difficult 
for the reader to rely on this postulate as the discussion becomes more 
complex.18 
Thomson's inability to categorize varied situations leaves the 
reader desiring further investigation of open hypotheticals, although 
this would mean expansion of an already dense and reasonably long 
work. For example, Thomson concludes her discussion of the trolley 
hypothetical with a short, nonanalytic paragraph suggesting that even 
though it is permissible for Bloggs to turn the trolley, "[t]he view that 
morality requires Bloggs to tum the trolley seems to me to be merely a 
morally insensitive descendant of the Central Utilitarian Idea" (p. 
196). Bloggs, for example, might think such things should be left to 
chance, or to God, or might merely feel incapable of killing someone. 
16. The situation then mirrors Thomson's transplant hypothetical, where she similarly ar-
gues against killing one to save five. 
17. The famous trolley hypothetical is adapted from PHILLIPA FOOT, The Problem of Abor-
tion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect, reprinted in VIRTUES AND VICES (1978). As Thomson 
restates it: 
An out of control trolley is hurtling down a track. Straight ahead of it on the track are five 
men who will be killed if the trolley reaches them. Bloggs is a passerby, who happens at the 
moment to be standing by the track next to the switch; he can throw the switch, thereby 
turning the trolley onto a spur of track on the right. There is one man on that spur of track 
on the right; that man will be killed if Bloggs turns the trolley. 
P. 176. 
18. Thomson also suggests that this conclusion might be justified by an argument that our 
world lacks the medical certainty to ensure that an ex ante agreement endorsing such behavior 
would be in everyone's interest. This merely begs the question. 
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It seems at least plausible, however, to believe that any moral theory 
that permits killing one to save five should in fact endorse that action. 
Perhaps it would be wrong to attach too much blame to Bloggs' failure 
to act, but it would require more analysis than Thomson provides to 
conclude that acting and not acting are moral equivalents in this 
situation. 
These difficulties exist to some extent in all rigorous attempts to 
analyze moral rights, and discussion of them should not obscure the 
several strengths and consistent quality of Thomson's book. Many of 
Thomson's substantive arguments are important and well-reasoned, 
especially the extensive and well-considered limitations she places 
upon putative rights. For example, she denies the existence of a right 
to be saved from death based on her previous conclusion that it is 
morally impermissible to take one of a person's two kidneys by force 
to save a dying person.19 She then uses this conclusion to argue that 
there is no natural right not to have one's livelihood diminished (pp. 
266-67) or to receive aid of any sort, even from the government.20 
After limiting the scope of natural rights, Thomson effectively ar-
gues that rights are not absolute and often ought not be accorded. For 
example, many writers suggest that A's feeling of obligation after 
promising B a banana implies that A ought to give B a banana. 21 They 
bolster this argument by claiming that A feels remorse if she fails to 
give B a banana, even if the failure was through no fault of her own. 
Thomson demonstrates that A's feelings do not require this conclu-
sion. For example, giving B a banana might be incompatible with a 
previous promise to give C a banana or might preclude A from giving 
the banana to D, a starving and potassium-deficient child. Surely it 
cannot then be the case that A ought to give B A's only banana. 
Thomson concludes that perhaps A should provide compensation for 
breaking her promise, but argues that this obligation does not change 
the correctness of A's failure to accord B's claim. Second, Thomson's 
argument that B's claim against A is exactly coextensive with A's obli-
gation to B demonstrates that rights are not absolute because A's com-
pliance with the obligation can only be obtained through socially 
19. P. 160. Thomson adds that this conclusion in no way contradicts the fact that there are 
many situations where a person very much should save another. 
20. Pp. 273-74. Assertions of such rights are particularly prevalent in Western Europe. See, 
e.g., European Social Charter, October 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89. Law professor David Schu-
man provides an illuminating discussion of American assertions of such rights, and the unhealthy 
effects of these assertions, in What's Wrong with Rights, OLD OREGON, Winter 1991, at 31. 
Thomson here is discussing natural rights that one has by virtue of being human. She is intimat-
ing no opinion on the question of whether such rights have been or should be conferred by our 
society, and avoids altogether the question whether such benefits should be provided even in the 
absence of rights. 
21. See, e.g., Ruth Barcan Marcus, Moral Dilemmas and Consistency, J. PHIL., Mar. 1980, at 
121. 
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acceptable coercion.22 Finally, Thomson responds to those who de-
fend rights as absolute by defining them conditionally.23 She claims 
that such defenses obscure the complexities inherent in the rights 
debate. 
The major difficulty this conclusion leaves unresolved is providing 
principled criteria for when claims (rights) may be violated. Thomson 
attacks the problem with her customary vigor. She first concludes, in 
opposition to strict utilitarians, that infringing a right is justified only 
when an increment of excess good is present. Second, Thomson argues 
that denying rights absolute force justifies concluding that different 
rights have different stringency. Consequently, different rights require 
different levels of benefit to justify infringement, levels proportionate 
to the harm that the infringement causes. 
Thomson's discussion is generally convincing, but she reaches one 
subsidiary conclusion concerning stringency that seems unwarranted. 
She asserts that, given any event A which would cause a result B, X's 
claim against Y not to do A is at least as stringent as X's claim that Y 
not do B (p. 273). Consider, however, an X with a rare disease (un-
known to Y) such that kicking her in the shin will cause her death. 
Certainly X's claim not to be killed is very stringent, and it is hard to 
imagine that the stringency of her claim not to be kicked in the shin 
(although real) is equal. Y is not as blameworthy for causing X's death 
by kicking her in the shin as she would be for shooting X in the head. 24 
Another strong point of The Realm of Rights is Thomson's lucid 
and insightful investigation of the relationship between natural rights 
and societal rights. She demonstrates the dichotomy by discussing the 
differences between the right to not be killed and the right to have 
one's garbage collected on Wednesdays (p. 76). The first must exist 
everywhere, and is anterior to any society. The second can exist only 
when granted by a society. These categories are not mutually exclu-
sive; some actions are prohibited by rights which are both natural and 
societal. For example, the right to not be assaulted is both a natural 
right and one conferred by the criminal law of most societies. 
Thomson continues her investigation by exploring the limitations 
on rights which follow from this dichotomy. First, any right which is 
purely societal can later be abrogated by the society. Second, she ar-
gues counterintuitively that rights that are simultaneously natural and 
societal may be abrogated by a properly constituted government. This 
22. Pp. 107-10. Although admitting that violence might be pennissible in a Hobbesian state 
of nature, Thomson argues that such violent coercion is not acceptable in any true society. P. 
109. 
23. For example, "I have a right that you not hit my nose unless some condition a - x 
exists" where (a .•. x) is the set of all conditions such that you may then hit my nose. 
24. For a classic common law investigation of the stringency problem, see Hadley v. Bax-
endale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854) (limiting damages, which seem analogous to an evaluation ofa claim's 
stringency, to those reasonably foreseeable). 
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is particularly true of privileges. For example, A has a natural privi-
lege to act in a manner offensive to others because persons have no 
claim to be free from belief-mediated distress. 25 Yet a legitimate 
lawmaker may take away this privilege (pp. 354-55). Finally, she ar-
gues that many rights we might consider natural are in fact purely 
social. A prominent example is her argument that the right to pursue 
and acquire property,26 often considered a natural right inherent in 
individuals, is in fact only a societal construct. Thomson derives this 
conclusion from her contention that the very ideas of ownership and 
property cannot exist in the absence of a settled society.27 
Thomson's considerable rhetorical skill makes her book a pleasure 
to read. The numerous hypothetical situations required are concise 
and imaginative and consistently illuminate the bases of her thinking. 
A memorable example depicts an intrepid explorer harvesting oil re-
sources on the moon, after the earth's fossil fuels become suddenly 
depleted. 28 She also effectively uses a small number of famous hy-
potheticals29 and the best of other authors. 30 The Realm of Rights 
does more than merely discuss what rights individuals possess; it as-
sesses the import of having a right and provides a concrete and invit-
ing framework for thinking about rights. As such, it is a welcome 
complement to her other writings about rights and a valuable aid in 
evaluating the numerous approaches offered by other writers. 
- Richard J. Mooney 
25. B's distress caused by the conjunction of A's action and some attitude or belief of B. Pp. 
253·59. 
26. The "right" to pursue and acquire property is here distinguished from the cluster of 
rights one obtains by virtue of "ownership," which almost all would agree is a social construct 
The right to strive to acquire the cluster of rights called ownership is much more widely accepted 
as a natural right. See, e.g .• JOHN LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF ClvIL GOVERNMENT ch. 5 
(1690). 
27. Thomson makes interesting observations about the moon. See text infra. Since property 
rights can only be created by a society in settled control over an area, the moon is not only 
unowned but unownable unless and until extensive settlement is present. This represents a con-
clusion of a different magnitude than that reached by Roman and common law analyses sug-
gesting that uncontrolled wild animals are unowned. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3. Cai. R. 175 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). Such analyses never disputed that the proper authority could decree own-
ership over such animals - the King could arrogate to himself ownership of all the animals in 
Sherwood forest. Similarly, the nations of the earth could theoretically dictate ownership of 
Antarctica because that area meets Thomson's criterion of being within the settled control of the 
"society" of humanity. The moon, however, is outside such settled control. Pp. 344-47. 
28. Pp. 328-29. Thomson's effective use ofhypotheticals has long been recognized. See, e.g., 
Cain & Love, supra note 12, at 1366-67 (discussing examples). 
29. Including the trolley and transplant hypotheticals. 
30. For example, she uses Nozick's example of an innocent victim strapped to a tank which 
is attacking an innocent third party. P. 370. See NOZICK, supra note 1, at 35. 
